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MAl'J FILE COPY 
DO NOr RL\lOYE 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., r.10NTANA) 
CHINESE-RUSSIAN CONVERGENCE IN ASIA 
Mr. President: 
August 1~,-1963-
There are obvirrJS reasons o~ health and skyrocketing costs o~ 
armaments which provide common or parallel motives ~or the Soviet Union 
and the United States to have sought the Test Ban Treaty . Beyond the 
obvious, other interests have undoubtedly entered into the search for 
agreement by each nation. These are not necessarily shared interests 
but nevertheless they are a part of the calculatio::ls of the balance of 
benefit on which the Treaty rests. 
It seems to me that the Senate should explore all of these 
factors in an effort to understand fully what is at stake in the act of 
ratification. Reference, for example, has already been made in the 
hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee to the growing estrange -
ment between Russia and China. That the question has been raised suggests 
an awareness of •rhat may be a most significant factor in the Soviet posi-
tion on the r~uclear Test Ban Tree. ty . Yet our knowledge of the Russian-
Chinese estrangement is too limited to permit a full comprehension of its 
implications either for Soviet policy or our own. For one thing, our 
reportorial coverage of the U.S.S . R. , particularly east of the Urals, is 
extremely limited and spasmodic. For another, our knowledge of what is 
transpiring in China comes to us largely second- or third-hand. 
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It is understandable, therefore, that the Sino-Soviet estrange-
ment has been analyzed in the press and elsewhere largely in theoretical 
terms. Scholars, journalists and intelligence technicians pore over 
the documentation and statements and reports which emanate from Russia and 
China. ~d in this fashion, the estr~.gement is interpreted to the ~ation 
almost whol~ in terms of ideological differences and the struggle to claim 
the high-priesthood of orthodoxy in the international Communist movement 
and with it, I suppose, the right to preach the eulogy at the burial of 
Capitalism. 
These ideological factors are undoubtedly deeply invol ved and I 
,.,ould not for a mCJJcnt underestimate them. But if I may be so bold as to 
suggest it, it seems to me that the great emphasis which is given to them 
in the information which reaches the government and the public may produce 
a serious uistortion of our concept of the actual situation. We may see 
the problem largely as a clash of Marxist theories or Communist personali -
ties which is destined to disappear as soon as the theories are straightened 
out or the present leaders, in time, go the way of all leaders. 
I should like to suggest that other, more m~udane and endurine 
considerations are involved in present Sino-Soviet difficulties, considera-
tions which will not easily be exorcised either by new theories or new 
leaders . 
It is to one of these considerations that I direct the attention 
of the Senate today. It may well be the most significant factor, in the 
Russian-Chinese estrangement, largely overlooked in the overwhelming 
emphasis which has been given to the ideological differences between 
Moscow and Peking. I refer to the geographic and cultural convergence of 
Russia and China in the inner recesses of the Asian continent. 
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This convereence, fljr. President, has been a source of intermittent 
friction between the two countries for a very long time . It has persisted 
irrespective of the ideological inclinations of Moscow and Peking at any 
given time in history. It long predates the advent of Communism in China 
and even Russia. Indeed, it predates the birth of Karl Marx by at least 
a century. 
The first recorded clashes between Russians and Chinese go back 
to the 17th century. Three hundred years ago, Russian traders and Cossacks 
first made contact with the outposts of Chinese-~~chu imperial power in 
the region north of M~nchuria . The early zone of Russian influence and 
authority in this desolate northeast corner of Asia, as against China, was 
established by a series of treaties begi~i~g with that of Nerchinsk in 
1689, and followed by Bur and Kiulmta in 1727, Kiakhta in 1768, and the 
Kiakhta protocol in 1792. A half-century later the Russian press southeast-
ward was resumed under Count Nikolai Muraviev-Amursky, the Governor General 
of Eastern Siberia, and his chief military aid, Captain Gennadii Ivanovich 
Nevelskoi. Again there followed a consolidation of the Russian position, 
in the Treaty of Aigun of 1858. This agreement brought into Russian posse9ion 
large areas of Northeast Asia which had previously been under Manchu control. 
Subsequently, Russia as well as other European powers and Japan 
exacted by guile, bribery or naked power, special economic privileges and 
territorial concessions from weak and corrupt imperial officials of China. 
By this process, the Russians penetrated south into Manchuria, establishing 
themselves at Dairen and Port Arthur on the Yellow Sea by the end of the 
19th century and penetrati~g Korea which had been for a long time in a 
tributary relationship with Peking. 
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Since that high -water mark, Russian influence in Northeast Asia 
at the expense of China ·~s fluctuated . In the face of a Japanese advance 
and the weakness of the early Soviet state, it receded. Under the Ccnmunism 
of Stalin it advanced once more at the end of World Har II . And under the 
Communism of Khrushchev it receded once more after the Chinese Communists 
came to power in Peking. 
Our sources of information are insufficient to provide a clear 
delineation of where the present line of convergence may lie, as between 
Russian aud Chinese influence in Northeast Asia . We are not even sure of 
vThat the precise situation i n this connection may be in Kcrea where we are 
de€.ply involved, let alone in Manchuria, of 'vhich we know very little. One 
thing is reasonably certain, however, the actual Russian-Chinese conversion 
does not bear much relationship to the border-demarcations as shown on 
ordinary maps. It is also clear, in any event, that the convergence in 
the Northeast is still much further south and east of a'\Y line vtbich would 
have been recognized by a Ching emperor of the Manchu Dynasty in the 17th 
century, the 18th or early 19th century . 
The rece~t history of the Chinese -Russian convergence in Northeast 
Asia has been affected, of course, by the appearance of Communist ideology 
in Russia and China . But sufficient experience is now accumulated to 
suggest that the future history of the region will hardly be dominated by 
this factor . 
And the history of the Northeast, a history of Russian advance 
and recession and advance--sometimes warlike and imperious and sometimes 
peacefUl and conciliatory--finds parallels elsewhere in Central Asia. 
During the last century, for example, Mongolia was entirely under nominal 
Chinese sovereignty. It was largely the efforts of Russians under th~ 
Czars coupled with the weakness of the later Manchu-Ching emperors which 
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brought about a loosening of Chinese control over the vast stretches of 
land now identified as the Outer Mongolian People's Republic. And it was 
largely the same combination of Soviet strength and Chinese weakness under 
the Chinese National Republic which resulted in 1922, in the establishment 
of an Outer Mongolia, not only independent of China but brought progressively 
into a relationship, apparently in the nature of a protectorate, with the 
U.S.S.R. 
South and west of Outer Mongolia we find in Sinkiang the same 
flo,.,, ebb and flow of Russian influence. Here, as elsewhere there was for 
centuries a tradition of Chinese suzerainty over small principalities of 
trloal peoples . But here as elsewhere this suzerainty has been quite 
devoid of significance in the absence of strong Chinese central power to 
assert it. Thus, in the last century, the Southwest edges of Sinkiang were 
chipped away and added to what is now the contiguous territory of the 
U.s.s.R. And even as rece:t1tly a:;; World \-Tar II the Russians exercised for 
a time scmething close to indirect domination over principal trading centers 
and caravan junctions in Sinkiang. 
Especially, since the advent of Chinese Cammunist control over 
the mainland, the line of convergence as betwe~n Russia and China in the 
Sinkiang area has apparently been pushed back westward once again. But 
how far and how firm this recession of Soviet influence has been, we do 
not really know with any degree of accuracy. 
To recapitulate, Mr. President, I have sought to point out to the 
Senate , that, historically, there has been not a fixed but a shifting and 
uncertain line of convergence between Russia and China in the inner recesses 
of the Asian continent. This line, Mr. President, is not necessarily the 
border as shown on contemporary maps but rather the changing extremity of 
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the eastward and south~-rard reach of Russian influence and the westernmost 
and northernmost extension of enforceable Chinese control. 
Further, history indicates that while there have been periods of 
stalemate and recession, the over -all pattern in the region for several 
centuries was that of Russian advance. It was an advance which paralleled 
roughly the spastic but steady decay of the Manchu-Ching dynasty through 
the reigns of a number of emperors. And it drew strength from the debili-
tation of the successor Chinese Republic in World l·lar II and the collapse 
of the Japanese intrusion on the Asian mainland in that conflict . 
\olhat prou.J?ts me to make these observations at this time, Mr. 
President, is that they may be of more than historic interest in the light 
of the present Sino-Soviet estrangement . This break cernes at a time when 
there has emerged in Peking once again, a strong centralization of Chinese 
power. To be s·.u-e, the government vrhich wields this power proclaims its 
Marxism. Indeed, it claios to be more Marxist than Moscow. Yet insofar 
as Chinese Marxism is expressed in practice on the borders of China, it 
appears to bear a remarkable resemblance to classic Chinese dynastic policy. 
There are strong iLdications, for example, that the present 
Chinese gover~~ent is not disposed to regard any of its borders- -at least 
none fixed after the time of the advanced decay of the Ching Dynasty--as 
permanently constricting on the o~tward extension of its power. That such 
.· 
is the case is indicated by the Chinese assertion in Korea, in Viet Nam, 
in Laos, in Tibet and beyond Tibet into Ladakh a~d the Northeast Frontier 
Agency at the two extremities of the I ndian sub-continent. 
vlhat, then, of the Sino-Soviet border regions? Are these, teo, 
to be affected by the reassertion of Chinese power? I have already referred 
to the recession of Soviet influence in Manchuria and Sinkiang, although 
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to what extent and ho1-1 vultmt~rily it has occurred, we do not know with any 
degree of precision . But whatever its extent, it would be a relatively 
minor recession should the Chinese assertion against the U.S.S.R., in time, 
parallel its policies with regard to Korea, Southeast Asia and the Chinese-
Indian border region. If there is this parallel then the Chinese claim 
against the U.S .S . R. could conceivably extend out of Sinkiang, through the 
Soviet Pamirs to Afghanistan. It could also embrace all of Outer Mongolia 
and the Soviet Maritime Provinces along the Pacific. For these areas fell 
within the reach of Manchu China in the heyday of the dynasty . 
It is interesting to note in this connection, Mr. President, that 
when Mr . Khrushchev, late last year, taunted the Chinese Communists for 
accepting the presence of colonialists in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao while 
urging him to act against the United States, he was answered in an editorial 
on March 8 in the Chinese People's Daily and Red Flag which reads in part 
as follows: "During the hunfu'ed or so years preceding the victorious 
Chinese Revolution, the colonial and imperialistic powers - -the USA, Great 
Britain, France, Czarist Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal--became unreservedly engaged in a 
campaign of aggression against China. They imposed on the various regim~s 
of the old China numerous unequal treaties: The Treaty of Nanking in 1842; 
the Treaty of Aigun in 1858; the Treaty of Tsientsin in 1858; the Treaty of 
Peking in 1860; the Treaty of Ili in 1881; the Convention for the Extension 
of Hong Ko~ in 1898; the Treaty of 1901; etc . . .. By virtue of these 
unequal treaties, they annexed Chinese territory in the North, South, East 
and West; or they caused territories to be ceded to them on lease along 
the coast of China and even in the Chinese hinterland .. .. When the People's 
Republic of China was founded in 1949, our Government clearly stated its 
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intention of eventually re-examining all th~ treaties concluded by previous 
Chinese regimes with foreign governoents and, according to their respective 
texts, either recognizing, denouncing, revising or renegotiating them at 
the appropriate time. 11 
Note, Mr. PreGident, the reference in this catalogue of unequal 
treaties to the Treaty of Aigun which fixed the present-day boundaries in 
Manchuria at China's expense and to Russia's advantage. And note in con-
junctio~ therewith this paragraph in the same editorial: "Certain persons 
(an obvious reference to Mr. Khrushchev) would like us to raise the quPstion 
of the unequal treaties here and now.... Have they realized ,.,hat the con-
sequences of this might be?" 
The implication is clear, ~tr. Preside~t. ~le Chinese regard 
certain Soviet territories no less than Hong Kong and Macao and Formosa as 
having been taken inequitably from China and subject, therefore, to 
Chinese claim. 
Now, f{r. President, I do not wish to leave the impression that 
China is about to embark upon a general war with Russia to bring back into 
the historic embrace of Peking, certain lands along the inner Asian borders. 
But I do suggest that the arro\-r-tips of Chinese influence are already 
pointed outward from Peking into these sparsely inhabited regions whose 
predominant population is neither Chinese nor Russian but Mongol and other 
tribal peoples . Many techniques are already apparently operating to this 
end including the Chinese aid-programs in Outer Mongolia and the organization 
of automonous tribal groupings on Chinese territory. Certainly such limited 
information as we have with respect to the region hint at the likelihood 
that the Chinese arrows have begun to prick the Russians in these remote 
regions. 
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I would su3gest further, Mr . President, that Soviet foreign policy 
is not formed in ignorance of these recent developments or the history '"hich 
I have just recounted, or of the actions of the Chinese in Southeast Asia 
and on t~e Indian border. And there is no reason to assume that because it 
is Communist, Russian foreign policy is concerned any less with such con-
siderations than might be the case with the foreign policy of any other nation. 
I would suggest, finally , that it is becoming apparent that we 
have been in error in assuming for so long that the iron-hand of Moscow was 
so unshakeably fixed on Peking that it had superceded all other factors for 
all time in the considerations of the Cc~-r.unist leaders in Chi&le. Theoretical 
Con;munist world unity, '1-Thatever its weig"lt, Pas not replaced certain enduring 
factors in the relationships of Rus3ia aAld China as they are indicated to 
us by history. 
And one of these factors, perhaps, the most significant, as I 
have tried to explain to the Senate today, is the convergence of Russian 
and Chinese influence in the vast inner recesses of Asia. The problems 
w!:ich are posed by the convergence are not essentially those of Ha.rxist 
theory . And they certainly are not those of a. common border dispute, that 
is, whether to move the markers a. few yards or a. few miles in one direction 
or the other . What is involved is the ultimate disposition and utilization 
of a reserve of millions of square miles of territory,largely devoid of 
human habitation. 
This land and its contents constitute an enormous and largely 
unexplored and unexploited resource. Hereto~ore , it may have been of minor 
importance because of the inadequacies in techniques of modern development 
and transportation, particularly in that part of the world. But with the 
rapid dissemination and multiplication of these techniques, the region 
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grows rapidly in significance to the two great peoples which converge upon 
it. And it grows, teo, in significance, as the population of China, already 
in the vicinity of 700 millions, expends eA~losively and presses ever mere 
heavily on limited resources even for a bare minimum of food, clothing and 
shelter. 
So, Mr. President, if we wish to understand fully the motives of 
the Soviet Union in seeking a nuclear test ban treaty, we ought not to 
overlook the factor of the Si no-Soviet convergence, a factor which is 
clearly indicated by history but which cannot be weighed accurately without 
a better ~derstanding of wnat is presently transpiring in interior Asia. 
In any event, it would be unwise to dismiss the l ikelihood of a 
growth of tension at various points of contact along the thousonds of miles 
of this vague frontier . Some might anticipate with relish the prospects of 
these clashes, even if they were nuclear . That prospect might be bent and 
twisted, I suppose, into an argument against tha proposed Trea~J to ban 
nuclear tests. 
But that, Mr. President, ,.,ould be a most distorted vie,., of nuclear 
real ities and contemporary international relations. For, if the flames of a 
great nuclear conflagration are lit, it will matter little who holds the 
match or where in the wor ld it is struck. Even the vastness of Central Asia 
woul d be insufficient to contain the holocaust or to confine it to the two 
massive Communist powers of Eurasia . No, Mr . President, the probability of 
increasing tension in the Sino-Soviet convergence, as in the case of all 
significant international tensions, is one more reason for seeking to bring 
about rational control over the growth and spread of the immense destructive 
power of nuclear weapons. 
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Rather than an argument against this Treaty, then, this probable 
tension in Sino-Soviet relations is an argument for this nation to seek to 
improve its comprehension of the actual situation which exists in Central 
Asia. For that region and what transpires iu it is likely to have a most 
profound significance in a world in which the peace and security of this 
nation is closely interwoven with that of all others . 
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